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R387Sensory Systems: Auditory Action
Streams?
The visual system is suggested to have two main processing streams, dorsal
and ventral, the former being an ‘action stream’ concerned with motor
responses, as opposed to perception. Two recent studies suggest the
existence of a comparable mechanism in the auditory system.Timothy D. Griffiths
An influential idea about the visual
system is that visual information is
analysed in two main processing
streams, with distinct functions:
a dorsal stream that allows motor
responses to visual stimuli; and
a ventral stream, concerned with
perception, for example, object
recognition. The motor function of the
dorsal visual pathway was suggested
by subjects with lesions of the
pathway, who were shown to be
capable of producing correct grasping
responses to object changes that they
could not perceive [1]. These results
were consistent with the idea that the
visual dorsal stream can act as an
action stream that allows appropriate
motor output in the absence of
conscious perception. Two recent
studies [2,3] raise the question of
whether there may be a parallel
mechanism in the auditory system.
The studies consider two very
different groups of subjects, at either
end of the musical spectrum. One
study looked at trained singers, with
results suggesting they can adjust
their vocal output in response to pitch
shifts in their own voice that they are
unable to perceive [2]. And a report
published recently in Current Biology
[3] suggests that subjects with
congenital amusia (tone deafness) can
produce changes in vocal output in
response to target pitch changes that,
again, they cannot perceive.
Data on macaque monkeys [4] have
led to the suggestion that the auditory
system has an equivalent of the visual
dorsal stream, which is concerned with
spatial information in the auditory
domain and localized to the posterior
part of the superior temporal lobe.
There are also human data [5]
supporting this view that auditory
spatial analysis is carried out in the
posterior superior temporal lobes. A
number of workers [6,7] have also
emphasised connections between the
posterior part of the human leftsuperior temporal lobe and the area
for vocal production in the left inferior
frontal lobe. Could this mechanism
be an auditory action stream that
allows appropriate motor output in
the absence of conscious perception?
Hafke [2] studied the output of
trained singers when the feedback
that they received from their own
vocal output was manipulated to
change the pitch [1]. The subjects
were required to produce a constant
note, and the feedback that they
received was shifted in pitch after two
seconds. The study could be criticised
on the grounds that criterion-free
psychophysical methods were not used
to establish perceptual thresholds.
Nevertheless, the data suggest that,
for small shifts in the pitch that they
cannot perceive, the singers make
changes in output pitch in response
that are in the opposite direction to
the pitch shift in the feedback.
In this [2] study, the subjects
adjusted motor output in response
to manipulation of feedback that
corresponds to the motor output.
This is distinct from the visual study
of Goodale et al. [1] in which motor
responses to an external target were
required. The study of Loui et al. [3]
is based on a design that is easier to
compare directly with the earlier
visual study. In this case, the
subjects listened to tone pairs and
were required to indicate the
perceived pitch direction and also
to reproduce the pitch interval by
humming. While normal subjects had
similar thresholds for pitch perception
and pitch reproduction, those with
congenital amusia scored at chance
level in a test of pitch-direction
perception, but scored above chance
level in a test of pitch-direction
reproduction. The authors went to the
trouble of measuring thresholds in a
subset of the amusic subjects to
demonstrate that ‘action thresholds’
were lower than ‘perception thresholds.’
These data can be interpreted in
terms of a preserved action stream insubjects with congenital amusia. In
some senses, the work takes the study
of this disorder full circle. Whilst tone
deafness was originally recognised as
an inability to sing in tune, subsequent
work has shown that the condition
involves a core deficit in the perception
of pitch and melody [8]. The study of
Loui et al. [3] re-emphasises the study
of output in this disorder. An immediate
question that arises from the work is
why the output of these subjects is
so terrible, if they are able to match
target-pitch direction? The answer
may lie in abnormal output pitch
excursion — subjects can match the
direction but not the magnitude of the
pitch change in the target.
Unlike the previous visual study of
patients with well-defined lesions, in
the case of congenital amusia, any
underlying lesion is subtle and the
subject of debate. One study of
amusic subjects [9] found changes in
the right superior temporal and right
inferior frontal cortex and the
connections between these, whilst
other work [10] has demonstrated
changes in the left temporal and
frontal lobe. Both structural studies
were carried out by seeking
correlation of brain structure with the
deficit defined in perceptual terms.
Whatever the exact basis for the
perceptual deficit, the behavioural
work of Loui et al. [2] suggests that
the output disorder may actually be
more subtle than the input disorder,
and helped by control mechanisms
for vocal output in the left frontal lobe
that are not yoked to perception.
The new studies of Hafke [2] and of
Loui et al. [3] will stimulate further
efforts to make robust comparisons
of auditory input and output in normal
and abnormal auditory cognition to
further validate the concept of an
auditory action stream.
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It has long been known that we can
‘see’ how many objects there are up to
about four without counting; for more
than four, some kind of sequential
enumeration process was assumed to
determine the number [1,2]. We can,
however, also make an estimate. In
a study published recently in Current
Biology, Burr and Ross [3] show our
estimates are based on ‘‘a primary
visual property of the scene’’ that can
be radically modified by visual
adaptation.
Suppose you glance at a speckled
hen, and notice that it has quite a lot
of speckles. You have the impression
that each speckle has a definite shape
and a definite location in space, but
your glance leaves no time to count
them. Does your percept have
a definite number of speckles, even
though you don’t know the exact
number? This is a problem that has
troubled philosophers since it was
first formulated by A.J. Ayer in 1940
[4]. Ayer’s solution was that the
percept (sense data) does not have
a definite number unless you actually
enumerate the speckles. This is
unsatisfactory. The hen has a definite
number of speckles, and one could
count, say, exactly 48 in a photo that
corresponded to your percept. But
on Ayer’s account, there are not 48
speckles in your percept, nor 47 nor
49, nor any other number [5]. This is
rather like saying that there will be
a test next week, but on no particular
day. Nevertheless, we might still
have an estimate of the number of
speckles — for example, that there
are more than 10 but less than 100.deficits in pitch perception underlying ‘tone
deafness’. Brain 127, 801–810.
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The question then becomes, how is
this achieved.
Burr and Ross [3] have produced
a remarkable new demonstration that
the numerousness of the speckles is
just as much a ‘primary visual property’
of a scene as their location, their colour,
their size, their spatial frequency or
their orientation: ‘‘just as we have
a direct visual sense of the reddishness
of half a dozen ripe cherries so we do
of their sixishness’’. Like other primary
visual properties, numerousness is
susceptible to adaptation. In the new
experiments, an adapting patch
viewed for 30 seconds with a large
number of spots (rather than speckles)
made the test patch which followed
seem to have fewer elements. The
size of the effect is extraordinary.
After an adaptor of 400 dots, the
‘point of subject equality’ (PSE) was
three times as great as for the control:
that is, the test needed three times as
many dots to be regarded as
numerous as the probe. Control
experiments that manipulated the dot
size and the contrast in the adaptor
scarcely affected the PSE, indicating
that it is indeed numerosity that is
being adapted.
This discovery has implications
beyond the narrow confines of visual
psychophysics, for it provides
evidence that the human brain is set
up to extract the numerosity
parameter from a visual scene, just
as it extracts colour. One implication
of this, though not one Burr and
Ross [3] mention, is that we are born
with this capacity.
This is not uncontroversial. On the
one hand, Starkey and Cooper [6] and
many others (for example [7–9]) haveNewcastle University Medical School,
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discriminatively to the numerosity of
visual arrays, even to quite large
arrays of dots provided the ratio
difference is large enough [10]. On
the other hand, Mix et al. [11] claim
that ‘‘infants start out with a
sensitivity to approximate quantity
based on overall amount’’ (p45) not
numerosity, and some studies show
that infants respond to the total area
covered by the dots, rather than
numerosity, when the two are in
conflict [12]. In Burr and Ross’s [3]
adults, the control for overall
amount rules this out as an
explanation.
The remarkable adaptation effect
reported by Burr and Ross [3] can be
seen in the on-line demonstration. This
uses an adapting patch in each visual
hemifield followed by an identical test
patch in the corresponding spatial
locations. Strikingly, the test patch
that follows the more numerous
adaptor seems to have fewer dots
than its identical counterpart, without
any particular dots seeming to have
disappeared. So how can the
apparent numerosity of the dots
be decreased without annihilating
any of them?
Burr and Ross’s [3] proposed
solution is that the visual system does
not record speckles on the hens, but
rather extracts a statistical description
of the speckledness of the scene.
This is in line with the ‘sparse coding’
hypothesis that, although we have
the impression of great richness and
detail, our conscious percept records
only the important features and then
fills in the rest [13]. This makes
intuitive sense. The hen will have
a definite number of speckles, and
we can count them if we want to,
but if we don’t, there is no point
making each and every one of them
available for further cognitive
processing.
This leaves two problems. First,
what is the mechanism that
constructs a statistic describing the
